在现代金融体制中的系统性风险[文献翻译].doc

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1、外文文献翻译译文一、外文原文原文：Systemic risk in modern financial systemsPurpose：In recent years, the financial system has been changing rapidly. At the same time, macroeconomic volatility has fallen in developed countries. The purpose of this paper is to examine how these developments may have affected the nature

2、 of systemic crises. The paper also aims to discuss how central banks and other financial regulators might respond to these developments with a clearer, more rigorous, operational framework for their systemic financial stability work. Findings：The models suggest that financial innovation and integra

3、tion, coupled with greater macroeconomic stability, have served to make systemic crises in developed countries less likely than in the past, but potentially more severe. Implementing a practical framework for financial stability work in response to this raises many formidable challenges.Practical im

4、plications：If individuals are risk-averse, the recent change in the profile of crises could lower welfare and would suggest that policymakers should place a higher premium on actions to monitor and mitigate systemic risk. The analysis also highlights the importance of differentiating the probability

5、 of risks from their potential impact.IntroductionSystemic risks are the risks over and above those naturally priced and managed by financial intermediaries themselves. They pose a threat to the effective functioning of the financial system as a whole and to the economy more broadly. As Hoggarth sho

6、w, systemic financial crises have major economic costs, which extend well beyond the losses borne by the shareholders of failing financial institutions. The maintenance of financial stability is, therefore, a key objective for central banks and other financial regulators.But how is this role evolvin

7、g? In recent years, the financial system has been changing rapidly . As financial integration has taken place, ties between institutions which compose the “financial network” have grown, both domestically and internationally. Sophisticated financial products, such as credit default swaps, collateral

8、ised debt obligations, and a range of derivative-based instruments, have mushroomed, and resale markets for capital have deepened. At the same time, macroeconomic volatility has fallen in developed countries . Policymakers are divided over the fundamental question of whether these forces have made t

9、he public good of systemic stability more or less important. Some argue that they have increased the resilience of the financial system and reduced systemic risk. But there is growing concern that while these developments may have helped to reduce the likelihood of systemic crises, their impact, sho

10、uld one occur, could be on a significantly larger scale than hitherto.The first part of this paper reviews some theoretical work being conducted at the Bank of England to explore this issue. The results from this work suggest that financial innovation and integration, coupled with greater macroecono

11、mic stability, have indeed served to make crises in developed countries less likely than in the past, but potentially more severe. These findings indicate that financial crises may be more costly than was previously the case. They also imply that when assessing threats to the financial system, it is

12、 important to consider separately the probability and impact of the crystallisation of various risks. The second part of this paper discusses how central banks can respond to these challenges by developing and implementing a clearer, more rigorous, operational framework for their systemic financial

13、stability work.Systemic crises in the modern financial systemGai develop a theoretical model of systemic crises in which instability is associated with asset “fire sales” during periods of stress. The setup builds on Lorenzonis analysis of lending under endogenous financial constraints and asset pri

14、ces. More generally, it is related to the literature stemming from Kiyotaki and Moore that analyses how financial frictions arising from contract enforcement problems can amplify shocks to the macroeconomy.The model contains three types of agent: consumers, intermediaries and firms. Consumers are we

15、ll-endowed but can only produce using a relatively unproductive technology operating in the “traditional” sector of the economy. Therefore, they channel funds through intermediaries to firms operating in the more-productive sector of the economy.Intermediaries are best viewed as operating in the mod

16、ern financial system: they could be interpreted as traditional banks, but the model is also designed to apply to the activities of hedge funds, private equity firms, and other non-bank financial institutions. They borrow from consumers and invest in firms.Firms have no special role in the setup. The

17、y simply manage investment projects in exchange for a negligible payment this could be viewed as following from perfect competition amongst firms. This implies that intermediaries effectively have complete control over investment projects.The assumption that intermediaries have financial control ove

18、r firms may appear somewhat extreme. But it embeds some of the recent developments in financial markets in a simple way. In particular, as Plantin et al. (2005) stress, the greater use of sophisticated financial products such as credit derivatives, and the deepening of resale markets for capital hav

19、e made it easier for intermediaries to trade their assets. This especially applies to non-traditional financial intermediaries.Intermediaries borrow from consumers by forming state-contingent equity-type contracts with them. But these contracts are subject to limited commitment and potential default

20、. This friction imposes financial constraints on the contracts: specifically, the amount that intermediaries can borrow is restricted by a maximum loan-to-value ratio, and the ability of intermediaries to insure against bad outcomes for investment projects is limited1.This friction is fundamental to

21、 the model: without it, systemic financial crises would never occur. It means that if an adverse aggregate shock hits the productive sector, intermediaries may be forced to sell assets (capital) to the traditional sector of the economy to remain solvent. In the spirit of Shleifer and Vishny (1992),

22、this distress selling causes the asset price to fall2. In turn, this creates a feedback to net worth that affects the balance sheets of all intermediaries, potentially leading to further asset sales. Since intermediaries do not account for the effect of their own sales on asset prices, the allocatio

23、n of resources implied by the market is inefficient. For sufficiently severe shocks, this externality is capable of generating a systemic financial crisis that may be self-fulfilling.From this discussion, it is clear that the scale of the shock is a key factor in determining whether a crisis occurs.

24、 But how do changes in macroeconomic volatility and financial innovation influence the likelihood and potential scale of systemic crises?Lower volatility is modelled via a reduction in the variance of shocks hitting the productive sector of the economy. As would be expected, this makes crises less l

25、ikely since severe shocks occur less frequently. However, greater stability also makes “recession” states less likely to occur. As a result, consumers are more willing to lend, allowing intermediaries to increase their borrowing and initial investment. But if a crisis does then ensue, more capital w

26、ill be sold to the traditional sector, the asset price will be driven down further, and the crisis will have a greater impact. Towards a practical framework for financial stabilityThe analytical results above suggest that financial systems in developed countries may be becoming more robust, yet more

27、 fragile at the same time . Financial innovation and integration, coupled with greater macroeconomic stability, may have reduced the probability of systemic financial crises in recent years. But should a crisis occur, its impact could be greater than was previously the case.If individuals are risk-a

28、verse, this change in the profile of crises could lower welfare and would suggest that policymakers should place a higher premium on actions to monitor and mitigate systemic risk. The analysis also suggests that when assessing possible threats to the financial system, it is important to differentiat

29、e the probability of risks materialising from their potential impact should they materialise.In view of this, many central banks charged with supporting the stability of the financial system as a whole are working towards developing and implementing a clearer, more rigorous operational framework for

30、 their financial stability work. For example, the Bank of England is placing a stronger emphasis on quantifying the likelihood and potential costs of the crystallisation of various risks. The aim is to use this information to help produce an analytically robust register of the current top five to te

31、n threats to the UK financial system. A longer-term ambition is to produce a summary measure of aggregate risk facing the UK financial system. Should, for example, the financial stability authorities be more or less concerned than a year ago?In contrast to monetary policy, the financial stability ob

32、jectives of central banks are less well defined. Though the definition is rather narrow and clearly has its limitations, the Bank of England has taken balance sheet losses to the major UK banks, and the continued health of the core UK banking system and financial infrastructure as an initial point o

33、f departure for its quantified assessment of risks.When attempting to gauge the relative importance of these risks, the measurement of tail-event probabilities is particularly problematic. One possible way forward may be to define a specific stress event of a certain impact, such as one causing the

34、major banks to lose half their tier 1 capital over the next three years. This could then be used as a normalisation device. Leaving aside the problem of defining the objective function, how can central banks implement a clear framework for identifying threats and for measuring their potential impact

35、? One fairly obvious, but not completely trivial, point is that there is a myriad range of potential shocks that could affect financial systems. Trying to identify, assess and rank all of these would be a very difficult task. A potentially more productive and practical approach is to identify areas

36、of major weakness or vulnerability in financial systems, for example, where asset price valuations appear stretched or outside historical norms, or where there are concentrations of credit or market exposure, or where financial balance sheets are coming under strain. Candidates for the list of syste

37、mic risks could thus be more accurately described as “systemic vulnerabilities”, which could, in turn, be triggered by particular economic or financial shocks.In the UK, for each potential systemic vulnerability, the Bank of England tries to gauge the probability that they will crystallise in “moder

38、ate” and “severe” ways. Such estimates, however, remain subject to wide margins of uncertainty and may not fully capture non-linear effects, which may be especially relevant in extreme scenarios. In particular, they do not account for potential important feedbacks through asset markets or the possib

39、le effects of disruption to the liquidity of markets. Building an empirical stress-testing model to incorporate these effects and to capture the impact of financial innovation remains a difficult challenge.It is also clear that central banks need to improve their understanding of how financial syste

40、ms fit together as networks. Building on the theoretical work discussed above and on empirical work conducted by Oesterreichische Nationalbank on the Austrian interbank market, the Bank of England is currently developing an empirical model of the UK financial network. However, data limitations can b

41、e a major difficulty in constructing such a real-world model, with the frequency and amount of information available on bilateral interbank exposures depending on country-specific reporting requirements. Further, financial innovation and asset market linkages may mean that “connectivity” is more com

42、plex than implied by direct interbank exposures alone. Risk transfer instruments, for example, may make it harder to define “links”. Addressing this is clearly another challenge for quantification.Despite the imperfections of the current analytical toolkit, there are clear benefits for policymakers

43、from developing a more quantitative basis for addressing financial stability issues. A first benefit is in terms of sharpening the rigour and discipline of the risk assessment work undertaken by central banks, forcing them to be clear about what is known and what is not, and helping them to concentr

44、ate resources and attention on what are judged to be the most important issues. An important objective for central banks should be to provide clearer messages to financial market participants and other authorities on why some threats are judged as important and others as not. This should raise the v

45、alue-added of risk assessment work.The second benefit is in delivering improved risk reduction and crisis management. A clearer analysis of how risks propagate through the financial system, and which threats are perceived as the most costly, should help in the prioritisation and design of risk mitig

46、ants, and in the formulation and testing of financial crisis management preparations. Ensuring appropriate follow-up actions to address major vulnerabilities is an important step in operationalising financial stability work.In that context, analysing and designing risk mitigants to limit systemic fi

47、nancial risks remains another underdeveloped area. At present, regulatory requirements are typically calibrated to measures of idiosyncratic risk in individual institutions. However, an improved analytical framework for financial stability could be used to quantify an institutions marginal contribut

48、ion to systemic risk . Source: Prasanna Gai, Nigel Jenkinson, Sujit Kapadia,2007.“Systemic risk in modern financial systems”. Journal of Risk Finance. February.pp.156-165.二、 翻译文章译文：在现代金融体制中的系统性风险目的：由于近年来金融系统的变化飞快迅猛。与此同时，在发达国家出现了宏观经济的波动下降的现象。本文写作目的是分析这些发展现象对系统性金融危机的性质可能造成的影响。本文还旨在讨论中央银行及其他金融监管机构为了他们的

49、系统性金融的稳定工作，对这些发展现象会如何作出一个更明确的，更严格的以及可操作的业务框架的响应。发现：本文模型表明：金融的创新与整合将更多地同宏观经济的稳定性相结合，这也促使在发达国家发生的系统性金融危机不太可能像过去一样，但是可能会更严重猛烈。为了应对这些日益凸显的艰巨挑战，我们可以实施一种切实可行的经济框架。现实意义：如果个人是风险规避的，那么，金融危机所反映的的最新变化：如它可以导致社会福利的降低以及会暗示决策者应采取上调津贴界限的行动，以此来监测和减轻系统性风险。这些分析还强调了从他们的潜在影响中得出风险概率的重要性。简介系统性风险是超出了由金融中介机构自身对风险的估值及管理。他们对整个金融系统的有效运作以及对经济构成更广泛的威胁。正如拉森指出：系统性的金融危机会造成重大的经济代价，这代价远远超出了失败的金融机构的股东们所承担的损失。因此，对于各国中央银行和其他金融监管机构的主要目标是维护金融稳定。但是，这种现象是如何发展？近年来，金融系统变化迅猛。随着金融一体化发展，在国内以及国际的各金融机构之间已形成了“金融网络”。高级的金融合作成果迅速产生（如信用违约互换，债务抵