软件产业和印度的经济发展论文外文翻译.doc

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1、目录外文原稿12中文译文18外文原稿212中文译文217外文翻译之一Competition and Cooperation in Industrial Cluster: The Implication for Public PolicyDavid NewlandsEnglishEuropean Planning Studies, Vol.11, No.5(2003)2. Industrial Clusters: A Critical Reading of Different Theories2.1Standard Agglomeration Theory, From Marshall Onwa

2、rdsMarshall, in his writings on Sheffield, Lancashire and other British regions, viewed the main source of external economies as the commons, the infrastructure and other services from which each individual firm in an industrial district might draw (Marshall, 1921). Examples include, in modern termi

3、nology, improved job search and job matching, more favorable access to capital finance and inter-firm labor migration. The availability of such common resources to a number of firms then enhances their size and diversity as both capital and labor are attracted to such areas to exploit the larger mar

4、kets for their services. This in turn leads to reductions in factor prices and/or increases in factor productivities. These are the ways in which the external benefit to firms of a location in the industrial district manifests itself. Unit production costs will be lower within the industrial distric

5、t than out with it. Parallel to his studies of industrial organization, in the various editions of his Principles of Economics, Marshall (1890, 1920) helped develop what was to become standard agglomeration theory. This was then built upon subsequently by a number of writers. For example, Scitovsky

6、(1954) identified a further category of pecuniary external economies, Perroux (1955) contributed his famous theory of growth poles, and Chinitz (1961) applied the notion of agglomeration economies to the economic development of New York and Pittsburgh. More recently, Krugman (1991, 1995) has emphasi

7、zed the importance of increasing returns as a favorable condition for the development of external economies. Porter (1990) can also be understood as belonging to this lineage in the sense that external economies make up many of the key relationships within his famous diamond.Standard agglomeration t

8、heory provides an explanation of why firms might cluster together, sharing a commons of business services and a diversified labour force, and forming extensive local linkages with other firms. However, it conforms to neo-classical theory in that local economies are viewed as collections of atomistic

9、 businesses, aware of one another solely through the intermediation of price/cost signals. Firms continue to compete with each other although Marshall was keen to warn of the risks that firms collaboration, in the development of shared inputs, risked blunting competitive forces.2.2 Transaction Costs

10、: The Californian SchoolIn the writings of the Californian school, the disintegration of productive systems leads to an increase in firms transaction costs (Scott & Storper, 1986; Scott, 1988; Storper, 1989). Changes in market and technological conditions have led to increased uncertainty and greate

11、r risks of over capacity (of labour and capital) and of being locked into redundant technologies.The response of deepening the organizational division of labour leads to an increase in the number of formal market transactions external to the firm. There may also be an increase in the unpredictabilit

12、y and complexity of transactions. The costs of carrying out certain types of transactionespecially those where tacit knowledge is important or trust is required and thus complete contracting is impossiblevaries systematically with distance. Thus, agglomeration is the result of the minimization of th

13、ese types of transactions costs in a situation where such minimization outweighs other production cost differentials.The Californian school sought to explain observed agglomerations of economic activity. The argument centered on the localization of traded interdependenciesor simple inputoutput relat

14、ionsbut this is at best only a partial explanation, not least in being unable to distinguish convincingly between good and bad agglomerations. Agglomerations have been found in high wage, technologically advanced industries and low wage technologically stagnant ones alike while there are technologic

15、ally dynamic agglomerations which lack the dense inter-firm linkages and coordinating institutions of a new industrial district.Nor is it clear whether markets will succeed in coordinating transactions within clusters (Cooke & Morgan, 1993). The management of traded interdependencies is exactly what

16、 we think of as the business of markets but there may nevertheless be market failure. Thus, certain “transactionsin labor markets, in inter-firm relations, in innovation and knowledge developmenttended to have points of failure in the absence of appropriate institutions” (Storper,1995, p. 199). With

17、 this concern for the institutional arrangements within clusters, the Californian school came to share certain of the arguments of the flexible specialization theorists who are discussed next and the institutional and evolutionary economists who are considered shortly.2.3 Flexible Specialization, Tr

18、ust and Untraded InterdependenciesWhile neo-classical economics views firms as atomistic businesses, aware of one another only through formal market signals, modern industrial district theory emphasizes the interdependence of firms, flexible firm boundaries, and the importance of trust in creating a

19、nd sustaining collaboration between economic actors within the districts.These themes arose first in the literature on flexible specialization in the Third Italy(Brusco, 1982) but was later extended to Baden-Wurtemberg and other regions (Piore & Sabel, 1984). The sources of flexibility lay in collab

20、orative networks of (mostly) small firms and supporting institutions. These networks permitted the establishment of trust between actors, a crucial argument within most contemporary approaches to clusters. The reasoning is that firms within networks of trust benefit from the reciprocal exchange of i

21、nformationparticularly tacit information that cannot be codifiedbut are simultaneously bound by ties of obligation which regulate behavior. Trust thus reinforces mutually beneficial relationships between firms. The implicit assumption is that trust is more likely to be sustained in geographically co

22、ncentrated networks than more dispersed ones (Belussi, 1996).Firms may cooperate in seeking to get new work and may bid together on large projects. They may form consortia to access cheaper finance. They may jointly purchase materials and conduct or commission joint research. They may plan together

23、and receive technical, financial and other services from the commons. However, despite all these examples of cooperative relationships, founded on or reinforced by trust, because they remain privately owned businesses, firms within clusters continue to compete, with one another and with other firms,

24、 often more on quality than price.The embedding of economic relations into a wider social framework appears to be most common where business activity is conditioned by local politics, religion and close kinship and friendship relationships. Thus, “it is probably not a coincidence that the most succe

25、ssful districts have tended to be the most racially and culturally homogeneous” (Harrison, 1992, p. 479). Equally, national (or other broader) economic, legal and policy traditions are relevant. The development of inter-firm cooperation is more likely in some countries, such as Italy, than in others

26、, such as the UK, because of differences in the operation of labor markets and competition policy.According to theorists such as Granovetter (1985), trust arises from the digestion of experience. Trust accumulates from repeated interactions between firms and other actors in which they contract and r

27、econtract, formally and informally, strike deals, and help each other out at times of crisis. Trust results from a process of learning through experience which actors can be relied upon. Personal contact facilitates such repeated interactions and this in turn is likely to depend on proximity. This f

28、ocus on untraded interdependencies is very different to the transactions costs approach to agglomeration. The latter concerns the cost minimization of traded relations while untraded interdependencies point to wider processes of the optimization of non-market or non-contract exchanges (Raco, 1999).F

29、inally, it is important to note that untraded interdependencies can not only facilitate effective collective learning and action but also impede it. Especially where familiar conventions become well established, sclerosis can set in. Areas can become locked into outdated and inferior technologies an

30、d institutions.2.4 Innovative Milieux: The GREMI GroupThere have been various schools of thought on the relationship between innovation, high technology industry and regional development. One line of enquiry has focused on the conditions for the establishment and growth of such high technology compl

31、exes as Silicon Valley and Route 128. While many factors have been identified, the most discussed is the role of local research intensive universities, Stanford in the case of Silicon Valley and MIT in the case of Route 128. A large literature on the relationship between innovation, research univers

32、ities and regional development has been spawned (Saxenian, 1985; Castells & Hall, 1994; Storper, 1993).Another direction of research has been in pursuit of the notion of an innovative milieu, the key theoretical concept of the GREMI (Groupement Europeen des Milieux Innovateurs) group of regional eco

33、nomists (Aydalot & Keeble, 1988; Camagni, 1995). Clustering enables firms to benefit from a collective learning process, operating “through skilled labor mobility within the local labor market, customersupplier technical and organizational interchange, imitation processes and informal cafeteria effe

34、cts” (Camagni, 1991, p. 130). This processdraws upon “an intricate network of mainly informal contacts among local actors made up of personal face-to-face encounters, casual information flows, customersupplier cooperation and the like” (Camagni, 1991, p. 131).However, there is a certain ambiguity as

35、 to what precisely milieux are. By some readings, a milieu is a set of institutions, practices and rules which provide a framework for development which guides and coordinates the activities of innovators. By other readings, a milieu is a network, of firms, research institutes and policy-makers, whi

36、ch provides the necessary coordination for successful innovation.These different interpretations, together with the very intangibility of milieux, are the sources of major intellectual problems. Thus, the GREMI group “has never been able to identify the economic logic by which a milieu fosters innov

37、ation. There is circularity: innovation occurs because of a milieu, and a milieu is what exists in regions where there is innovation they do not specify the potential mechanisms and processes by which such milieux function” (Storper, 1995, p. 203).2.5 Institutional and Evolutionary EconomicsA furthe

38、r approach derives from institutional and evolutionary economics (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Amin & Thrift, 1992; Amin, 1999). Technological change is seen as path dependent since it involves sequenced, and not simultaneous, choices which are often irreversible. There is a spatial dimension to such choi

39、ces with interdependencies between organizations being both traded and untraded. The latter include rules and conventions which shape the development and communication of knowledge between local actors. Given that there are strong irreversibilities, observed clusters are to some extent accidents of

40、history, reflecting the impact of past choices, although their development is also influenced by the appearance and growth of reinforcing institutions.This approach is potentially very fruitful in understanding the nature of competition in contemporary capitalism (Dosi et al., 1987). Standard econom

41、ic theory conceptualizes competition as the location on a production possibility frontier that maximizes a firms comparative advantage given an existing set of factor prices. Competition is a state, characterized by the absence or minimization of monopoly rents (Nickell, 1996). In contrast, drawing

42、upon an Austrian perspective, institutional and evolutionary economics views competition as a process of economic change, spurred by constant technological change. Thus, if innovation is the driver of competition, a firm (or locality) may possess technologies which are superior to those of others re

43、gardless of the level of factor prices.This distinction has come to be known as that between weak competition and strong or Schumpeterian competition (Hudson, 1999). Weak competition involves the search for lower cost means of producing existing goods with existing technologies. Strong competition i

44、s a strategy which involves the creation of new goods or of new technologies to produce existing goods.产业集群中的竞争和合作：应用于公共政策David Newlands英国欧洲策略研究，2003年第11期2.产业集群：对不同理论的批判性解读2.1标准的集聚理论从马歇尔（Marshall）开始马歇尔在他关于Sheffield, Lancashire等其他英国地区的著作中认为外部经济的主要来源是共同的，即个体企业在一个产业地区可能享有的基础设施和其他服务等（Marshall, 1921）。用现代

45、术语来阐述，例如增加的工作寻找和匹配机会，更加便捷的融资渠道和企业之间的劳动力转移。因为被吸引到这些地区的资本和劳动力开拓了更广阔的市场，所以对大量的企业而言，这些共享资源的可获得性提高了企业的规模和多样性。这些反而导致了要素价格的减少或者要素生产效率的增加。这就是在一个地区产业集群内，企业获得外部利益的方式。单位生产成本在一个产业区内将低于在产业区之外。与他的产业组织理论类似的，马歇尔在他的各种版本的经济学原理书中，发展了标准的集聚理论。之后的很多理论发展都是基于这个标准集聚理论。例如，Scitovsky（1954）进一步认证了无偿劳动的外部经济的种类，Perroux（1955）发表了著名的

46、增长极理论，Chinitz（1961）将集聚经济设想应用于了纽约和匹兹堡的经济发展中。更近地，Krugman（1991, 1995）开始强调增加收益的重要性外部经济发展的有利条件。Porter（1990）也被理解在其著名的钻石理论中，认为外部经济占有极其重要的位置。 标准的集聚理论试图解释为什么企业会集聚在一起，分享共同的商业服务和多样化的劳动力，与当地企业建立广泛联系。然而，与新古典主义一致的是， 二者都认为当地经济只是由很多微型商业所组成的集合体，彼此之间通过价格或成本信号为媒介机制来观察。尽管马歇尔已经预警在投入共享的发展过程中，企业合作将面临日益钝化的竞争力风险，但是企业之间还是不断地

47、进行竞争，在发展共同投入时，风险将减弱竞争的力量。2.2交易成本加州学派在加州学派的著作中，生产力系统的分散性导致了企业交易成本的提高（Scott & Storper, 1986; Scott, 1988; Storper, 1989）。市场和技术条件的变化增加了不确定性，加大了劳动力和资本过剩以及被过剩技术锁定的风险。对深化劳动力组织分散的反映导致企业外正常市场交易数量的增加，甚至会增加交易的不确定性和复杂性。实施特定交易类型特别是那些需要默契或相互信赖，因此完全合同又是不可能的交易成本，会随着距离不同而出现系统性差异。因此集聚是最小化此类交易成本的产物，因为此类最小化超过了其它生产成本的差

48、异。所以，在交易成本的最小化超过其它生产成本差异时，集聚就是最小化这些交易成本类型的结果。加州学派试图对现存的经济集聚活动寻求解释。他们争论的焦点集中于贸易依赖（或者仅仅是投入和产出关系）的本地根植性，但最多也只是部分解释，至少能很信服地给出好和坏集群之间的区别。有高工资、技术先进的产业，低工资且技术停滞的产业，同时也存在技术上很有活力但却缺乏新产业区应有的企业间联系和协调机构的产业。然而市场是否会在协调集群内交易方面获得成功，仍然是不明显的（Cooke & Morgan, 1993）。交易依赖性管理正如我们所看到的市场商业一样，也存在着市场失灵。因此在缺乏适当的机构的情况下，交易在劳动力市场、在企业内部关系、在创新和知识发展方面的将倾向于出现失灵（Storper,1995, p.1995）。出于对集群内机构安排的担忧，加州学派与提倡灵活专业化的专家，制度和演化经济学家在某些观点上具有相似之处，这两个学派在接下来将会被谈到。2.3 灵活专业化，信赖和非贸易相互依赖性新古典学派视企业为微型商业体，企业间仅仅通过正常的市场信号来观察彼此，现代产业区域理论强调企业间的相互依赖性，灵活的企业边界和信任在创造和维系区域内经济主体之间合作的重要作用。这个议题的文字记载最早出现在“第三意大利”（Brusco,1982）的灵活专业化理论中，但是之后在Baden