税务会计与财务会计一致下影响公司会计政策选择的因素【外文翻译】.doc

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1、原文：Factors influencing a firms accounting policy decisions when tax accounting and financial accounting coincide1.1.IntroductionA firms accounting policy decisions are made on the basis of the onsequences of the alternative policies。According to Holthausen and Leftwich, afirms reporting policy choic

2、e has economic consequences when changes in the rulesused to calculate accounting numbers alter the distribution of a firms cash ows, orthe wealth of parties who use those numbers for contracting or decision making. Inaddition to their use in the contracting agreements between the various parties of

3、 afirm, reported accounting fi the level of panys tax liability . This is the case,provided that the same accounting treatment is used for financial reporting and taxpurposes alike. Tax planning can result in an increase in the firms tax saving andconsequently it can have a positive effect on a firm

4、s cash ows .As a consequence,assuming rationality and efficient capital markets, an accounting policy thatminimizes taxable ncome should be preferred ;However, given that the reduction of afirms tax liability is usually panied by a corresponding decrease in itsreported e, tax planning, under certain

5、 circumstances, can have seriousimplications for various parties involved with a firm. The unfavorable picture of thefirms financial position that may emerge as a result of a decrease in the level ofreported figures, can have serious consequences with regard to firms ability to meetits contractual a

6、nd regulatory obligations, while shareholders and managerspersonal wealth may be affected as well. These implications have been designated asthe non-tax costs-or financial reporting costs-of a tax reducing policy. Each party ofa firm is supposed to trade-off the tax benefits of an accounting choice,

7、 against theensuing non-tax costs. The e of this trade-off is supposed to inuence afirms accounting policy decisions. The aim of this study is to provide an understanding of the factors that inuencethe accounting-policy decisions of firms operating in an accounting environment inwhich tax rules are

8、used for financial reporting purposes. For this purpose, ounting environment of Greece has been chosen. In Greece, tax accounting andfinancial accounting coincide and it is expected that tax considerations will inuencemanagements accounting policy decisions. This study investigates whether non-taxco

9、nsiderations can inuence firms accounting-policy decisions and prompts them todeviate from a tax-reducing policy. The structural characteristics of the broadereconomic and business environment of Greece affect the significance of the non-taxcosts relating to a particular accounting policy decision.

10、The similarities of the ounting and business environment with that of other European and non-Europeancountries means that the findings of this study may be of some help in understandingthe accounting policies of firms operating in other countries. 1.Factors giving rise to significant non-tax costs T

11、he significance of tax benefits and non-tax costs are conditional upon certaincharacteristics of a firm. A firms ownership structure has been hypothesized to beassociated with the magnitude of the non-tax costs that can be generated fromtax-minimizing strategy. The management of firms characterized

12、by a diffusedownership and a separation between management and ownership mightfacesignificant non-tax costs. The extensive use of accounting-basedcontracts in thesefirms can induce managers to assign a great deal of importance to the level of e. Furthermore, managers perceptions regarding the impact

13、 that accountingfigures have on their evaluation by the external users of accounts may make themparticularly concerned about the level of reported profits. On the other hand, for thosefirms in which ownership is concentrated in the hands of a relatively small number ofshareholders who actively contr

14、ol the firms management, the necessity for using abonus scheme is reduced, while managers municate any information directlyto shareholders without having to use published financial statements (Klassen, 1997).Thus, non-tax costs may be of lesser importance and firms are expected to pursue amore aggre

15、ssive tax-reducing policy. The findings of empirical research seem tosupport the argument that parison to the widely-held firms, the closely-heldones are less concerned about the non-tax consequences of their accounting choices,and they are more inclined to implement a tax-reducing strategy (Smith,

16、1976;Dhaliwal et al., 1982; Hunt, 1986; Penno and Simon, 1986; Niehaus, 1989; Scholesand Wolfson, 1992; Wolfson, 1993;Cloyd et al., 1996; Klassen, 1997). In Greece, as in many European countries (e.g. France, Italy), theownership-structure of the majority of the firms is characterized by a high leve

17、l ofconcentration (Nobes and Parker, 2000). In most cases the owners are activelyinvolved in panies administration, occupying important posts within anizational structure of their firms (OECD, 1995; Makridakis et al., 1997;Sykianakis, 2004). Firms owners can directly and effectively monitor and moti

18、vatetheir subordinate managers and they do not need to employ incentive schemes.Further, managers in such firms municate information regarding theirperformance directly to their superior owner-managers without having to rely uponfinancial statements. Under these circumstances, it is argued that theo

19、wnership-structure of most Greek firms contributes to the adoption of an aggressivetax-reducing strategy, since their ownership status does not appear to generatesignificant non-tax costs. The use of accounting figures in a firms negotiations with the providers of creditcapital, and the inclusion of

20、 accounting numbers-based terms in the debt agreements,suggest that a particular accounting choice can generate important non-tax costs(Wolfson,1993). Lower reported profit figures may adversely influence thebankscredit decisions, and thus raise the cost of capital for the firm (Deakin,1979).Further

21、more, the violation of the terms of loan agreements places a firm intechnical default, a situation that can have particularly adverse consequences for afirm(Gopalakrishnan and Parkash, 1995). In order to reduce the likelihood that theseevents will occur, firms are more likely to adopt an e-increasin

22、g accountingpolicy. However, such a decision is most likely to be associated with important taxcosts, since the resulting increase in the reported e is likely to follow anincrease in taxable e (Maydew, 1997). The financial leverage of a firm is usedas a proxy for the firms need for debt capital, and

23、 its proximity to violating debtcovenants (Christie,1990). The more leveraged firms are expected to face highernon-tax costs, and thus they are more likely to select the e increasing choice.Findings of empirical research suggest that the more leveraged firms do trade-off taxbenefits against non-tax

24、costs. Banks are the main providers of funds for panies. The dominant roleof bank credit in the financing of business enterprises is a distinct characteristic notonly of the Greek business environment, but also of many other Europeancountries(e.g. France, Germany). Banks have developed a close relat

25、ionship panies, while in certain cases they own part of the firms share capital. Thus,banks in many instances may directly obtain any relevant financial information,without having to rely upon publicly disclosed data. It has been argued that the factthat financial accounting in many European countri

26、es has been dominated by taxregulations and has never developed into a genuinely independent branch ounting can be partially attributed to the fact that when: . . . even panies in continental countries are dominated by banks,governments or families, the need for published information is less clear .

27、 Furthermore, in Greece the large state-controlled banks are not supposed toalways base their credit decisions on entirely objective and rational financial criteria(OECD,1995; Papas, 1993; Makridakis et al., 1997). Consequently, the importance ofpublic accounting information may further diminish. Mo

28、reover, a consequence of theclose relationship between banks panies is such that a violation of a debtcovenant may not have serious consequences for a firm. Within this context, atax-reducing strategy is not likely to give rise to important non-tax costs. Yet, some significant non-tax costs can stil

29、l arise. Even if economic criteria donot always play a crucial role in banks credit decisions, panies will berequired to meet some official criteria based on accounting numbers when making aloan application. If the applying firm has a strong link with a particular bank, onecannot rule out the possib

30、ility that the banks officials will tolerate some “adjusting”of accounting figures in order to allow the firm ply with the relevant terms.Thus, a tendency of a firm to influence accounting figures through the choice of anappropriate accounting policy may be reinforced. Furthermore, it cannot be assu

31、medthat all firms enjoy the privilege of having a close relationship with a bank. As aconsequence, financial accounting considerations can still influence a firmounting-policy decisions. Within a framework of efficiently functioning capitalmarkets, shareholders of public (listed) firms would prefer

32、higher cash flows, sincethat would result in higher share prices. Consequently, higher tax-savings would bepreferred. This could have been the case for Greek public firms, since the majority ofthem are owner-controlled firms and stockholdings constitute a substantial proportionof the personal wealth

33、 of the owner-managers. Yet, the perceived influence ounting figures may have on the firms share price can enhance the importanceassigned to financial reporting figures. A firms management might believe thatreported figures have a considerable impact on its share price. This impact maybegreater than

34、 that resulting from a possible change in the level of firms tax-liability.In this case, it is possible that a firms management will aim to report higher figures inorder to influence its share price, despite a corresponding increase in tax costs. Thus,public firms are more likely, compared to the pr

35、ivate (non-listed) ones, to prefer e increasing option. The fact that the owner-managers are prepared to forego taxbenefits in order to achieve higher reported earnings, does not imply that they do notaim towards the maximization of a firms value, and as a consequence of their wealth.The owners-mana

36、gers believe that firms value is a function of the firms accountingprofits. As Cloyd et al. put it: If managers believe that stock prices react more strongly to reported e thanto cash flow, the public capital market introduces a potential non-tax cost that servesto discourage them from tax conformit

37、y, even if conformity increases the firmsexpected future cash flows. . . . , if new investors and creditors are willing to supplyfunds on terms that are affected by reported accounting numbers, managers andexisting shareholders may unanimously wish to report high e, even at theexpense of paying addi

38、tional tax. That is, firm value may be maximized by reportinghigher e rather than reducing tax payments Cloyd et al. According to the Greek financial press, accounting figures have a dominantinfluence on the firms stock value. Furthermore, it has been asserted that it is mon for listed firms to get

39、involved in e management through theselective application of accounting policies. Within this context, it can be expectedthat a tax-reducing policy due to its decreasing influence on the level of reportedprofits, can generate for the Greek public firms some non-tax costs, which mayprevent them from

40、pursuing such a policy.2.Methodology The above discussion indicates that managements perceptions regarding the impactof accounting figures on the users of accounts might generate important non-tax costsfor a firm pursuing a tax-reducing policy. A postal survey was conducted in order togather informa

41、tion relating to managements perceptions about the influence ounting figures upon the users of accounts. The respondents were asked to indicatethe extent to which they believe that accounting information influences: . the lending decisions of the providers of debt capital; and . the firms share pric

42、e. Furthermore, this study investigates the extent to which certain profit-relatedobjectives were pursued. The following e-related objectives have beenidentified: . the minimization of the firms tax burden; . the reporting of profits that will influence the firms share price; . the reporting of prof

43、its that will influence the banks credit decisions; and .the reporting of profits that will enable the firm to avoid breaching the debtcovenants。Source: Christos Tzovas. Factors influencing a firms accounting policy decisionswhen tax accounting and financial accounting coincideJ.Managerial AuditingJ

44、ournal, 2006:372-386.译文:税务会计与财务会计一致下,影响公司会计政策选择的因素 一个公司的会计政策的选择是以替代政策的选择为基础。霍尔索森和莱夫特威克认为,当一个公司报告政策的选择具有经济后果时,那么当事人一方使用会计数字就可以进行财富的决策,当这些数字的规则变化了,就会改变该公司的现金流的分布。此外,他们使用各个公司之间的合同协议,来报告一家公司的税收水平是否可靠。如果其税收水平是可靠的,那么相同的会计处理就可以用来反映在财务报告上并达到税收的目的。税收筹划可以使该公司达到少缴税的目的,因此,其对一家公司的现金流入具有积极的影响。假设市场是合理以及高效的,那么,会计政策

45、就可以达到税收最小化,收入与利润最大化的结果。然而,考虑到一家企业税收负担的减少通常伴随着其报告收入的减少,在特定环境下,税收筹划就可能对公司的一些相关方面产生重要的影响。该公司的一个不利方面就显现出来了,就是可能会带来该公司报告数据水平的下降,可能影响该公司有关的能力,股东和经理的个人财富也可能会受到影响。这些影响已被指定为“非税”的成本或财务报告的成本,从而妨碍了税收政策实施的有效性。每一个企业应该对随之而来的贸易非税收成本估量一个会计选择的税收优惠。这种权衡的结果应该能影响一个公司的会计政策的选择。 这项研究的目的是提供一个可理解的因素,这个因素可以影响一家公司在特定会计环境下对会计政策

46、的选择。为此,希腊的会计环境已被选定。在希腊,税务会计与财务会计具有一致性,能影响管理层的会计政策选择的确定。研究就是要探讨是否非税收方面的考虑会影响公司的会计政策选择的决定,并提示他们是否偏离了税收政策。在希腊更广泛的经济及营商环境的结构特点影响了非税收成本涉及到的特定会计政策选择。希腊会计和其他欧洲及非欧洲国家的营商环境的相似性意味着,这项研究结果可能对于在一定程度上了解其他国家经营企业的会计政策有帮助。在希腊,在许多欧洲国家(如法国,意大利),大部分的公司所有权结构的特点是高水平的高度集中(诺贝斯和帕克,2000 年)。在大多数情况下,业主积极参与其公司的管理,其在企业的组织结构中占有重

47、要的岗位(经合组织,1995年; Makridakis 等,1997;Sykianakis,2004)。公司的所有者可以直接和有效监督和激励下属的经营,他们并不需要使用刺激性计划。此外,这些公司的经理就可以传递信息,而不必依赖财务报表直接向上级所有者传递信息。在这种情况下,它认为大多数希腊企业的所有制结构有助于采纳一个积极的税收减少的会计政策,因为他们所有权状况似乎并没有产生明显的非税收成本。一家公司会计数据的使用与信贷资金提供者,以及对以会计数剧为基础的债务协议的条款列入都有关联。一个公司的谈判表明,使用一个特定的会计选择会产生重要的非税成本(欧胜,1993)。低报的利润数字可能产生不利影响

48、,从而提高公司的资本(迪肯,1979)的成本。此外,贷款协议的条款违反了地方的默认情况下,会产生一个坚定的(戈帕拉克里希南与帕卡什,1995 年)特别不利的后果。为了减少这些事件的发生的可能性,公司更可能采用收入增加的会计政策。然而,这样的决定是最有可能与重要的税收成本相联系,因为报告收入的增加很可能会导致后续的应纳税所得额(Maydew,1997 年)的增加。一个企业的财务杠杆运用,作为该公司的债务资本的需求代理,其邻近违反债务契约(佳士,1990 年)。越是运用杠杆的企业将越面临更高的非税收成本,因此他们更可能选择的使收入增加得选择。实证研究结果发现,更多的杠杆企业从非税收成本的权衡中取得

49、税收优惠。 银行是希腊公司资金的主要提供者。银行信贷在企业融资业务的主导作用是它的一个显着特点。银行已经与许多公司密切的关系,在特定情况下,他们自己就是公司的股本的一部分。因此,在许多情况下,银行可直接获得任何相关的财务资料,而不必依靠公开披露的数据。有人认为,事实上,很多欧洲的会计,尤其是财务会计一直占据着国家的税收法规和有没有发展成一个真正独立的分支机构可部分归因于一个事实: 国家甚至大陆的上市公司是由银行,政府或家庭为主,对发布信息的需要是不太清楚。 此外,在希腊的大型国有控股银行不应该时刻以完全客观、其合理的财政和信贷决策组织为标准(OECD,1995;帕帕斯,1993 年; Makridakis 等,1997。)。因此,公共会计信息的重要性可能会进一步减弱。此外,一些银行和公司之间的密切关系,可能会严重影响一些公司,违反债务契约可能没有为公